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Recent catastrophic disasters have highlighted the enormous human, 
economic, and material costs of information flow breakdown.  This study explores 
how significant information flow problems in catastrophic disaster response arise 
from fundamental, but critical, differences in institutional logics among the collection 
of organizations that are involved.  Documents will be analyzed using qualitative 
methodology to identify salient features of two of the institutional logics seen in 
disaster response and develop a framework relating the outcomes of the first 
responders’ actions to the logic employed.  This study identified the existing gaps in 
the publically-available accessible information about previous disaster response 
efforts and considers how this information can potentially be used to better 
understand the problems the United States faces in terms of effective disaster 
response.  This study has the potential to inform policy makers and organizations 
within disaster response in crafting better ways of utilizing information to minimize 
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Emergency services across the United States effectively respond to an 
estimated 240 million 911 calls annually – fire, police, and medical emergencies. 
(NEMA n.d.)  While this is a majority of the emergencies requiring assistance, this 
estimated number does not include the small percentage of emergencies in areas that 
do not use the emergency number 9-1-1 nor does it account for the emergencies that 
are happened upon by responders (such as a person walking into a fire department for 
help).  The emergency response system is responsible for the planning of emergency 
response in their communities, efficiently receiving distress notifications, dispatching 
the appropriate type of responder with the appropriate equipment who will mitigate 
the emergency as per their protocols (a mix of local, state, and federal regulations, as 
well as standards of care as defined by the discipline), completion of all appropriate 
documentation, then for resetting the emergency units with all necessary equipment to 
the proper location in order to be able to respond to the next emergency. (Pre-
Hospital Trauma Life Support Committee, 2003; AAOS 2010)   
The complex system consists of many diverse pieces, which varies from 
locale to locale.  (AAOS 2010; Pozner et al. 2004)  Each emergency situation requires 
a mix of responders from the different disciplines. For some emergencies, only the 
fire department company or a police officer is needed to handle the situation.  For 
others it can be complicated enough to warrant multiple fire department units, police 
units, emergency medical services (ground and/or air), or specialized units such as 
tactical units, hazardous materials specialists, or bomb disposal units.  And within 




handle different situations.  In addition, within many locales there are multiple types 
of emergency response organizations, such as municipal, commercial, or volunteer, 
that need to coordinate and share information in order to provide service to the 
general citizenry. (AAOS 2010; Pozner et al. 2004)   
Emergency response services in the United States is a loosely-coupled 
completely locally-based system.  (AAOS 2010)  Part of its effectiveness is that all 
responders are part of the communities they serve and are familiar with local 
resources.  Trust is built between the individuals and on the organization level, which 
is key for maintaining high reliability in critical situations.  (Weick 1987)  Standard 
operating procedures and response plans are crafted on the local level, adhering to the 
more distant regulations as put forth by the state and federal government agencies.   
Having an emergency response system which is locally-based, complex and flexible, 
while being adaptable to whatever situation arises is essential for the level of 
effectiveness required in order to handle the diverse range of unexpected and chaotic 
incidents. (Pre-Hospital Trauma Life Support Committee, 2003)  Coordination among 
multi-agency situations involves integrated information sharing and decision-making, 
with each agency having their own processes, types of information, applications, and 
technology. (Bharosa et al. 2010)  Coordination must involve the sharing of pertinent 
information and this type of information system is particularly vulnerable when the 
situation is complex and chaotic. 
There must be robust information systems in place prior to an actual 
emergency or disaster in order to have the chance of an effective and efficient 




management and coordination of multiple responder units, agencies, supplies and 
evacuations involves the sharing of the most up-to-date information in order to make 
effective decisions. (Barthel 2012; Dearstyne 2007; Bharosa et al. 2010; Bravata et al. 
2004)  As an example, correct information about the emergency has to get from the 
people in the emergency situation to the person (usually a dispatcher) who will collect 
the information then send along the appropriate responders.  The dispatcher also 
needs to know who and where the appropriate responders are, appropriate ways to 
reach them, and what the appropriate severity level the emergency requires.  The 
responders need to acquire information about the situation before passing it along to 
other responders on the scene and to outside organizations that need to know (such as 
local hospitals, the power company, or other response units that need to be dispatched 
due size or severity of the emergency).  The emergency is not concluded until the 
dispatching unit is updated that the responders are back in service and ready for the 
next emergency. (Pozner et al. 2004) 
A small percentage of emergencies can be considered disasters.  Disasters are 
“a low-probability but high-impact event that causes a large number of individuals to 
become ill or injured.” (Institute of Medicine Committee on the Future of Emergency 
Care in the US Health System 2007, pp. 175)  Disasters stretch the capabilities of the 
local emergency system (sometimes taxing the system to the breaking point) and the 
affected communities. (Quarantelli 2006; Institute of Medicine Committee on the 
Future of Emergency Care in the US Health System 2007)  Disasters are referred to 




when there are more victims that need assistance than there are first responders to 
help them. (AAOS 2010)   
There are slightly different protocols when there is an MCI, and usually an 
MCI prompts an activation of the local Mutual Aid agreements.  As an example, if a 
large building catches on fire, not only will the fire department(s) of the town respond 
but they will activate their Mutual Aid agreements and fire departments from 
surrounding towns will respond to assist in the firefighting.  These agreements are 
made between individual organizations, so towns or counties that border each other 
will invariably have these agreements but towns on opposite sides of the state will 
not. (Bravata et al. 2004)  In many cases, organizations that have mutual aid 
agreements will have cross-over trainings or meetings.  Tis builds trust and 
familiarity on the organizational- and individual-level.   
An example of disaster information flow was successful was the response to 
the bombing of the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, 
on April 19, 1995.  Emergency responders, government and non-profit responders 
were on scene within minutes of the explosion. (Moynihan 2009)  And both the 
Regional FEMA Operations Center and the FEMA headquarters were activated 
within the hour, with Urban Search and Rescue Task Forces (US&R) deployed within 
two hours of the blast. (Bosner 2011)  The response worked but it worked only 
because the Chief of the Oklahoma City Fire Department was a skilled commander 
and maintained command and control of the scene completely, directing all response 
efforts (which was actually not per the accepted protocols of the time). (Moynihan 




terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, is widely acknowledged as an example of a 
broken disaster response information flow.  The information that was available to 
responders and unit commanders was hard to understand and make sense of, was 
conflicting and difficult to interpret, and there was false information, all of which led 
to a series of events resulting in hundreds of responder deaths. (Dearstyne 2007)   
The emergency response system is a loosely-coupled network which 
significantly varies from locale to locale.  Despite all the complexity and challenges 
that a system like this faces, it needs to be ready at any time of every day to deal with 
the complete gamut of emergencies, and for the most part it reliability works to 
protect and save citizenry.   
1.1 Information and Catastrophic Disasters 
 A catastrophic disaster is a disaster on a larger scope, whereas a large 
geographical area is severely impacted.  The increase in size and severity means that 
there will be a need for a greater number of first responding agencies and a greater 
number of types of responders needed. (Quarantelli 2006)  The increase in scope 
changes what is needed for adequate planning, response, and recovery.  Since the 
normally-operating emergency response system functions on a local level, the 
increase in scope during a catastrophic disaster means the normal system can no 
longer function effectively. (Pretto & Safar 1991) Resources (including those needed 
for response, transportation, and evacuation) need to be shared and coordinated over a 
much larger area.  This means an effective information flow is even more crucial for 




In Quarantelli's (2006) discussion about the differences between disasters and 
catastrophic disasters, he hypothesizes that there are four main organizational 
differences: (1) organizations have to deal with and exchange critical information 
with many other organizations most of whom they are unfamiliar with, (2) personnel 
and organizations lose autonomy and freedom of action as opposed to what they are 
used to during normal activities, (3) different standards of performance are applied, 
and (4) public and private sector organizations need to interface much closer. 
(Quarantelli 2006)  In addition there are differences between the two that are seen not 
only at the organizational level but also at the community and societal levels: (1) 
community infrastructure is heavily impacted which includes the emergency 
organizations’ facilities and equipment, (2) outside people will need to assume 
leadership roles when local officials are unable to do so due to death or impairment, 
(3) assistance cannot be provided by nearby communities since they are all affected 
by the catastrophe, (4) most or all of the normal function of the communities is 
interrupted, (5) mass media socially constructs catastrophes more than disasters, and 
(6) the different layers of politics needs to directly interact and share information for 
decision-making. (Quarantelli 2006)   
These types of events have different needs and require different types of 
planning.  The personnel from the types of organizations that are involved with 
planning for a catastrophic disaster includes the emergency response agencies but 
also governments on multiple levels, schools, hospitals, utilities, transportation 
agencies, non-profit aid organizations such as the Red Cross, and advocates for 




challenges inherent in responding to catastrophic disasters and designing an effective 
response system arise from the inherent characteristics of catastrophic disasters and 
how they differ from normal emergencies.    
Coordination among the network of responding organizations and their 
smaller response teams is critical during catastrophic disaster response. (Barthel 
2012)  As an example, during the initial response to the terrorist attacks in New York 
City in 2001, firefighters were ordered to enter the second World Trade Tower to 
assist in evacuation of personnel.  But due to communication breakdowns, not all of 
the firefighters received the order for immediate evacuation and the results were that 
some firefighters were trapped for an extended period of time and some firefighters 
were killed. (Dearstyne 2007)  Information flow can be helped or hindered by a 
variety of factors such as technology, language, abbreviations, effective leadership, 
and pre-determined methods of communication. (Rowan 1991; NSTAC 2007; 
Bharosa et al. 2010)  In addition, coordination efforts between the differing 
organizations involved in disaster response are complicated by the diversity of 
organizations involved since each organization has its own methods of 
communication (including colloquial short-hand), purposes, policies, procedures, and 
expectations of duties. 
 There has been an increase seen in the past several decades of the rate of 
occurrences of catastrophic disasters.  The reasons for the increase that have been 
hypothesized include the increasing population density, change in overall climate 
patterns, and a hostile political climate that is producing large-scale terrorist attacks.  




States regions, with the consequences being a greater loss of life and property 
damage. (Ross & Lott 2003)  There has been an increase in severe weather patterns 
around the world over the past fifty years as the global climate has shifted. (Smith & 
Katz 2013; Institute of Medicine Committee on the Future of Emergency Care in the 
US Health System 2007)  There has also been an increase in man-made terrorist 
attacks world-wide, including bombings, chemical attacks and biological agent 
attacks. (Institute of Medicine Committee on the Future of Emergency Care in the US 
Health System 2007)  In the United States, some of the recent catastrophic disasters 
include the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the gulf hurricane season in 2004-
2005 (which included Wilma, Rita, Katrina and Dennis), and Superstorm Sandy 
which battered the east coast in October of 2012.  Just these three series of events 
caused over 5157 fatalities and cost over $298.3 billion in direct response and 
recovery. (National Climatic Data Center (NCDC) n.d.; Looney 2002)  To mitigate 
the effects of catastrophic disasters on the population, communities, and infrastructure 
there must be an effective catastrophic disasters response system that has a reliable 
and resilient communication system inherent in it. 
Per the Disaster Relief Act of 1974 and amended in 2007, the United States 
Congress has decreed that in the US, the federal government is responsible for the 
planning and preparing for future disasters, responding to disasters as they occur, and 
recovering and rebuilding after the immediate dangers have passed by providing the 
systems, processes, and funding. (42 U.S.C. §§ 5121-5206)  As of such, the Federal 
Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) was created in 1979 and it was an 




2003. (GAO 2006)  The agency was plagued by neglect and scandal from its 
inception until two hurricanes battered the United States (Hugo in 1989 and Andrew 
in 1992) and there was an extensive public outcry. (Bosner 2011)  After that there 
was a shift in the administration and FEMA was re-built to be more effective, 
responding to disasters such as the Oklahoma City Bombing in 1995 and developing 
the Federal Response Plan in 1992. (Bosner 2011; DHS 2013)  The Bush 
Administration came into office in the beginning of 2001 and worked to deconstruct 
FEMA. (Bosner 2011) 
 On September 11, 2001 a series of massive unexpected terrorist attacks hit the 
United States.  With virtually no federal-level leadership, the local emergency 
services did the best they were able to given the situation they faced.  The emergency 
response to these attacks exposed the flaws and breakdowns inherent in this 
ineffective system. (Institute of Medicine Committee on the Future of Emergency 
Care 2006)  “We all talk about our careers as before September 11th and after 
September 11th, and it’s been totally different.  It certainly has changed the way we 
do business…” stated FDNY Fire Commissioner Salvatore J. Cassano (McCallion & 
Heightman 2011).  The immediate result of the attacks in New York City alone was 
the deaths of 3,045 people including 441 first responders. (National EMS Memorial 
Service 2007; Statistics Brain n.d.)  No emergency situation should ever result in the 
deaths of first responders, this is an unacceptable failure.   
The 9/11 Commission, an independent bipartisan commission created by 
congressional legislation, stated that there were systematic failures that caused the 




the emergency response system were that: the 9-1-1 dispatch agencies were not 
adequate and not integrated into other parts of the system, there was no unified 
incident command, there were no integrated communications, there was no 
accounting of units or knowledge by commanders of where they were, there was no 
coordination among the various responder units, there was internal communication 
breakdowns, there was a lack of standard operating procedures among tertiary 
responders (i.e. Port Authority), there was a lack of communication and coordination 
among responders in their efforts to search and evacuate the Twin Towers, and the 
communication equipment did not work. (9/11 Commission 2004) The Commission’s 
recommendations included creating a universal response plan with clear command 
and control structures with appropriate processes and developing a common inter-
agency training system to foster building trust. (9/11 Commission 2004) 
 As a result of the events of 9/11/01, FEMA was subsumed into the newly 
created Department of Homeland Security (DHS) in March 2003.  (GAO 2006)  DHS 
was then responsible for taking these findings and recommendations and making a 
system that worked in catastrophic disaster response. (GAO 2006)  FEMA, as part of 
DHS, decided to address these issues with two major initiatives: funding for 
communication equipment and the creation of the National Incident Management 
System (NIMS).  The funding initiative was for agencies of all sizes to increase their 
capabilities to communicate with nearby agencies and funds were distributed as a 
grant program to those agencies that put in an acceptable proposal. (Walsh et al. 
2005)  The purpose of this new NIMS was to:  
“integrate the best existing processes and methods into a unified 




forms the basis for interoperability and compatibility that will, in 
turn, enable a diverse set of public and private organizations to 
conduct well-integrated and effective emergency management and 
incident response operations. It does this through a core set of 
concepts, principles, procedures, organizational processes, 
terminology, and standards requirements applicable to a broad 
community of NIMS users.” (DHS 2008, pp. 5) 
 
NIMS consists of five major components: “Preparedness, Communications and 
Information Management, Resource Management, Command and Management, and 
Ongoing Management and Maintenance.” (DHS 2008, pp. 7)  This complex system, 
with an emphasis on jargon, abbreviations, and intricate role titles, was designed to be 
used by every single agency in every single emergency response in every single level 
of response (local, state, tribal, federal) and was implemented in 2004. (Walsh et al, 
2005)  The information flow was to be fixed by having detailed hierarchical 
structures and reporting standards at every phase of a disaster response. (See Figure 
1) (For a further discussion of NIMS and its development, please see Appendix B.) 
 
 





In addition, about $41 billion was appropriated by Congress (in fiscal years 
2002-2012) to increase the capabilities of state and local governments to deal with 
major disasters, including implementing NIMS. (GAO 2013)  The national 
implementation of NIMS was seen by FEMA and DHS as the mechanism to fix all 
the information flow break-down (collaboration, coordination, and communication) 
exposed in the 9/11 Attacks and was successfully implemented. (National Incident 
Management System 2004; Walsh et al. 2005; Anderson et al. 2005)  FEMA 
announced the implementation of NIMS to the emergency response community along 
with the accompanying decree that all emergency agencies who received federal 
funding to have at least 80% of their employees become “certified” in NIMS by 
completing online training modules.  If all of these efforts were effective and 
successfully implemented, then there is an expectation that the next catastrophic 
disaster response would run smoothly with little unnecessary death or destruction.  
1.2 Context 
In August 2005, Hurricane Katrina made landfall in southeastern United 
States as part of a brutal hurricane season, which included Hurricanes Dennis, Emily, 
Rita, and Wilma. (NCDC n.d.)  Katrina caused over 1,833 deaths, affected over 
90,000 square miles, and prompted mass evacuations from five states displacing at 
least 600,000 households. (GAO 2006; NCDC n.d.)  The overall damage from 
Katrina is estimated to be $148.8 billion. (NCDC n.d.)  The federal emergency 
response of FEMA and DHS to Katrina has been seen as a failure in every way 
despite all the changes and funding enacted by DHS after 9/11. (Fischer et al. 2006; 




1.3 Research Question 
The question that will be explored in this study is: why do inter-organizational 
information flow break-downs persist within the planning and response to 
catastrophic disasters?  Specifically, the premise of this study is that significant 
information flow problems in catastrophic disaster response networks arise from 
fundamental, but critical, differences in institutional logics among the collection of 
organizations that are involved in catastrophic disaster response.  Institutional logics 
are “the organizing principles that shape the behavior of field participants” and “they 
define the content and meaning of institutions.” (Reay & Hinings 2009, pp. 631)  
Different fields or types of organizations, such as a federal government agency or 
bureaucracy, will have differing institutional logics that guide the beliefs and actions 
of the individuals in the organizations. (Reay & Hinings 2009)  This study examines 
the claim that while this difference is implicitly known, the failure to systematically 
understand it, exacerbates information flow problems and reduces the impact of 
efforts to address them. 
1.4 Summary and Chapters Ahead 
This study will focus on the planning and response to Hurricane Katrina in the 
New Orleans, LA, area.  This particular catastrophic disaster was chosen because of 
the scale of the event in terms of geography, amount of morbidity and mortality, and 
the amount of overall damage.  The timing of Hurricane Katrina allows the 
examination in situ of the usage of FEMA’s newly implemented NIMS protocols.  
There is also a rich corpus of government and official reports and academic literature 




was focused upon because of its limited geographical area, the impacts of the 
hurricane and subsequent levee breakage with flooding, and the availability of 
publically-available data. 
 The first section of this paper will examine the events and circumstances of 
Hurricane Katrina, focusing on the New Orleans area.  In the next section, a 
discussion of the study methodology will be presented with the findings following.  
Then the next section will be an exploration of the theory of institutional logics, with 
the focus being on two institutional logics that are consistently present in catastrophic 
disaster response systems: bureaucracies and High-Reliability Organizations (HRO).  
These coexisting institutional logics will be compared with the goal of identifying 
how differences between them might lead to problems with coordination and 
information sharing.  This study will conclude with a look at potential implications 









2 Hurricane Katrina 
 
A year before Hurricane Katrina made landfall, FEMA decided to run a joint-
training session that presented the situation of a major hurricane hitting New Orleans.  
The purpose of the “Hurricane Pam” exercise was to develop the best plan should the 
very real possibility of this type of catastrophic disaster to happen.  The simulation 
included the contracted consulting firm who was running it, FEMA representatives, 
State of Louisiana officials, representatives from the Corps of Engineers, New 
Orleans officials, Louisiana State University hurricane experts, and an observer from 
the White House. (Democratic Staff of the House Committee on Science, 2006)  The 
plan was never finished due to funding issues.  In the draft report (which was 
available to government officials prior to Katrina), it was stated that the planning 
showed there would be an estimated 100,000 citizens who would not have 
transportation to evacuate, there would also be over 60,000 fatalities, and that there 
would be over 380,000 injured or ill citizens. (Democratic Staff of the House 
Committee on Science, 2006)  The Democratic Staff of the House Committee on 
Science (2006, pp. 25) stated in their report about the response to Katrina, “with that 
as the backdrop for Katrina, one would expect that the Federal response would have 
been massive and aggressive.” 
Hurricane Katrina was the costliest and one of the five deadliest hurricanes to 
ever hit the United States. (Knabb et al. 2005; NCDC n.d.)  Katrina was especially 
well-tracked and accurately predicted by the National Weather Service (NWS). 




(See Figure 2 to see a picture of Hurricane Katrina’s relative size.) NWS’s 
abbreviated timeline of Katrina as presented in the report by the Democratic Staff of 
the House Committee on Science (2006): 
Tuesday, 8/23/05  Katrina forms as a tropical depression near 
Nassau in the Bahamas (the 12th tropical 
depression of the Atlantic season) 
 Advisory issued for a watch in southern 
Florida 
Wednesday, 8/24/05  5-day forecast puts Katrina’s path in Gulf of 
Mexico 
 Katrina is elevated to a Tropical Storm 
 Tropical Storm Katrina advisory is issued for 
southeast Florida coast 
Thursday, 8/25/05  Katrina elevated to Hurricane 1 level 
 Makes landfall as Hurricane 1 in Florida 
Friday, 8/26/05  Katrina enters of the Gulf of Mexico as a 
tropical storm 
 Katrina elevated to Category 1 hurricane level 
 Katrina is elevated to Category 2 level 
 Hurricane Katrina advisory issued warning of 
strengthening of storm to become Hurricane 3 
level for the next day 
 4 pm CDT Advisory issued - Katrina shifting 
more westward to be closer to MS coast with 
the potential of New Orleans in the impact 
area and gaining more strength to be a Level 4 
 10 pm CDT Advisory issued – estimated 
landfall is over or near New Orleans; 
projected intensity at Category 4 or 5.  
(Advisory issued 56 hours prior to 
landfall.)  
Saturday, 8/27/05  Katrina elevated to Category 3 hurricane 
 Hurricane Warning issued for the north 
central Gulf Coast.  Prediction of storm surge 
flooding 15-20 feet, with potential of 25 feet 
in some areas.  
Sunday, 8/28/05  Katrina elevated to Category 4 hurricane 
 Katrina elevated to Category 5 hurricane 
 Advisory issued – Katrina as “potentially 
catastrophic” hurricane or “extremely 
dangerous” 
 Advisory issued – “Some levees in the 




Monday, 8/29/05  Katrina downgraded to a Category 4 hurricane 
 6:10 am CDT Made landfall in southeastern 
LA as Category 4 
 10:00 am CDT Made second landfall at 
LA/MS border as Category 3 hurricane 
Tuesday, 8/30/05  10 am CDT Katrina downgraded to tropical 
depression 25 miles south of Clarksville, TN 
 
As a note, NWS did issue advisories as every conclusion was reached and when the 
probability of the models increased.  NWS also followed protocols by informing the 
necessary state and federal government officials, including the President of the United 
States and other senior government officials. (Democratic Staff of the House 
Committee on Science, 2006) 
Figure 2: Picture of Hurricane Katrina over the central Gulf of Mexico at 12:45 pm CDT August 28, 






Figure 3: Katrina’s track through the southeastern United States (National Weather Service, Weather 
Forecast Office Huntsville, AL 2013) 
 
 As of 4:00pm CDT on August 26, 2005, the National Weather Service’s 
National Hurricane Center predicted that Hurricane Katrina’s track had shifted and 
would now make landfall in the southeastern section of Louisiana (which includes the 
New Orleans metropolitan area). (OIG 2006) (See Figure 3 for a diagram of Katrina’s 
pathway) Officials in the southeastern states were in contact with the staff at the 
National Hurricane Center throughout the entire situation and activated their states’ 
Regional Response Coordination Centers. (Democratic Staff of the House Committee 
on Science 2006; OIG 2006)  Federal emergency declarations were issued for 
Louisiana on August 27, 2005 and for Mississippi and Alabama on August 28, 2005. 
(OIG 2006)  Despite all of the advanced notice, the mandatory evacuation of New 




am CDT due to the State Evacuation Plan that states that the mandatory evacuation 
should not begin prior to 30 hours before landfall in order to not clog the evacuation 
routes. (Fischer et al. 2006; Democratic Staff of the House Committee on Science 
2006)  The was the same day that Mississippi also declared an evacuation and since 
New Orleans only has two highways leaving the city and one of them is through 
Mississippi, the evacuation was slower than anticipated. (OIG 2006)  An estimated 
1.4 million people did evacuate from New Orleans. (Fischer et al. 2006) 
 The vulnerability of New Orleans to any severe storm due to its precarious 
geography has been well known in every level of the American Government. 
(Democratic Staff of the House Committee on Science 2006)  In addition, New 
Orleans has been hit by a range of hurricanes over the last century: Hilda in 1964, 
Betsy in 1965, Camille in 1969, Georges in 1998, and Ivan in 1999, which has 
highlighted the continual susceptibility of the city. (Democratic Staff of the House 
Committee on Science 2006)  Although there was no comprehensive disaster 
response plan for the city or the combined response agencies, the New Orleans Fire 
Department had instituted an internal plan several years prior, which allowed 
firefighters to effectively rescue thousands of citizens and combat the fires that 
sprung up.  (Hampton & McConnell 2006)  Part of that plan was to station a fire 
squad on a high-rise near the waterfront in order to keep an eye on the levees, and 
they were able to watch the major levees break as it happened and report to other fire 
department units. (Fincher oral history 2006)  This allowed the local units to quickly 
acquire boats to deal with the flooding. (Hampton & McConnell 2006)  By the time 




average amount of water being 6-8 feet.  (See Figure 4 to see the areas of flooding 
and how deep the flood waters got in the different parts of the city.) 
 
 




3 Institutional Logics 
 
 An Institutional Logic will develop and perpetuate because it offers benefits to 
the organization, individuals, and the larger environment it operates in.  In situations 
where there are co-existing Institutional Logics, collaboration and competition are the 
two main ways the interactions play out. (Reay & Hinings 2009)   
 
“Thornton and Ocasio (2008) define an institutional logic as the 
socially constructed, historical patterns of cultural symbols and 
material practices, including assumptions, values, and beliefs, by 
which individuals and organizations provide meaning to their daily 
activity, organize time and space, and reproduce their lives and 
experiences.”(Thornton et al. 2012, pp. 2)   
 
Institutional logics provides a metatheoretical framework that can be used to examine 
the relationships between individuals, organizations, and fields. (Thornton et al. 2012)   
This perspective takes into account such social systems and norms as decision-
making ability, status, authority, definition of organizational success/failure, 
vocabulary, as well as other features that are present in every organization.  Of the 
many Institutional Logics seen in agencies that are key to catastrophic disaster 
response, two that will be explored further are the Bureaucratic and the High 
Reliability Organizational Logic. 
As discussed by Adler (2012), a bureaucracy’s defining features are “the 
extensive formalized and standardized procedures, complex structures of specialized 
roles and departments, differentiated vertical hierarchy and centralized policy 
making, and substantial staff departments” (pg. 246).  The prime example of a 
bureaucracy is the United States Federal Government and all its sub-agencies and 




structure is that it facilitates an organizational competence that allows essential 
functions to be carried out no matter the personal knowledge or competence of 
individual people in the organization. (Adler 2012)  Authority and decision-making 
are given to individuals based upon their role, not their personal skills or knowledge.  
Bureaucracies are ideal at running complex systems that do not require continual 
quick reactions.  This primary benefit aids the federal government as it administers 
the large and complex functions that it is required to do for its effective continuation, 
which includes providing oversight, response and relief, and funding in catastrophic 
disasters. (McCarthy & Brown 2013)   
In order to enact change within a bureaucratic Institutional Logic, the leaders 
(those in leadership roles within the organization based on title and authority) will 
change the formalized documents that operator behavior is based on, such as Standard 
Operating Procedures, strategic plans, and written processes.  The notification of such 
changes will be in formal written communiques, such as memorandum.  So when 
FEMA and DHS were charged with fixing the disaster response system after 9/11, 
they crafted NIMS which included hierarchical structures, formal reporting 
requirements, and intricate roles.  FEMA created written online training modules for 
responders to be trained on the changing system (and the original modules had little 
or none audio-visual components such as pictures or videos and were written as a 
SOP manual).  They informed the emergency response agencies who would need to 
use the system via writing.  The mechanism DHS used in order to get compliance 
with the new program was to tie a measurable outcome (i.e. 80% of an agency’s 




the leverage they had with the agencies (i.e. if there was not compliance, federal 
funding would end).   All of these potential solutions and methods of communication 
were used because of the Bureaucratic Institutional Logic that FEMA and DHS have.  
Within their Logic, all of these efforts and changes would be successful and that was 
the anticipated result.  Unfortunately, the agencies that FEMA was dealing with have 
a competing Institutional Logic that is radically different from a Bureaucratic 
Institutional Logic. 
Emergency response agencies operate within the High-Reliability 
Organizational Institutional Logic.  A High-Reliability Organization (HRO) is a 
particular class of organization that has evolved in situations where the potential for 
normal errors has catastrophic results, such as loss of life or property. (Weick, 1987)  
There are five major characteristics of HROs as postulated by Weick and Sutcliffe 
(2007) which distinguishes how they operate differently in comparison to other types 
of organizations, HROs have a: preoccupation with failure, reluctance to simplify, 
sensitivity to operations, commitment to reliance, and deference to expertise.  
Common examples of places to find HRO teams within the literature are nuclear 
submarines, air traffic control, firefighting, nuclear power plants, deep-sea oil well 
platforms, and emergency medical services (EMS).  (Weick and Sutcliffe 2007; 
Bierly & Spender 1995; Klein et al. 1995; Weick 1993; Raslear 2006; Roberts et al. 
1994; Rochlin et al. 1987; Van Stralen & Mercer 2013)  One of the defining traits of 
HRO, no matter the field, is that all operators have a highly-developed situational 
awareness that is coupled with on-going sensemaking.  This means that all actions are 




written in a policy manual, which allows for rapid adaptation to handle chaotic, 
wildly fluctuating, potentially-dangerous situations. 
In order to enact change within an HRO Institutional Logic, a compelling 
narrative needs to be adopted and disseminated.  It is well-known within the 
emergency response community that information is shared primarily through the use 
of personal narrative or story-telling. (Weick et al. 1999)  Even formal trainings must 
involve an element of narrative, so usually at the beginning of a training session, there 
will be a real-life vignette of an applicable situation presented, which is then referred 
to periodically throughout the training, until the end when a conclusion with the 
outcomes of that situation is used as a conclusion. If there is a sufficient reason given 
with a compelling narrative (which promotes the buy-in of the responders) the 
subsequent change can be quick.  As an example of change within the EMS 
community, medical protocols change rapidly, with equipment and protocols being 
abandoned as new best practices are developed. Work-arounds are developed on an 
individual basis then shared widely through the use of stories.  Often times, the work-
arounds become formal procedure or protocol after being used in the field for an 
extended period of time.  As an example, the American Heart Association changed 
the guidelines for Cardio-Pulmonary Resuscitation (CPR) in 2010 to be focused 
primarily on chest compressions and not on artificial respirations. (AHA 2010)  
While within the EMS field, this practice had been going on for more than a decade.  
Understanding each individual Institutional Logic is instrumental before comparing 




 Co-existing Institutional Logics becomes a functional issue when there is a 
need to maintain each separate Logic while still having direct interactions.  The 
effects are even more severe when agencies and individuals in one Logic need to 
depend on the agencies or individuals of another Logic or when there are interactions 
for prolonged time periods.  Co-existing Logics tend to have one of two kinds of 
mechanisms in these situations: complimentary or competing.  An example of 
complimentary Institutional Logics is during the DMAT’s deployment, their FEMA 
representative had no maps and no sense of how to get the team to the Superdome 
(which was his primary job on this leg).  So one of the DMAT members, Richard 
Brown, went to the local bookstore in Houston right before they left for New Orleans 
and bought all the maps he could find of the New Orleans area.  He then gave the 
maps to his team and to the FEMA representative.  In this example, the HRO operator 
was able to adapt and problem-solve within the situation he found himself, then 
shared with the Bureaucratic operator, who could then do his job more effectively.   
 An example of competing Institutional Logics during the Katrina response 
was when two emergency physicians, one being Chris Najberg, and an ambulance 
company showed up at the FEMA outpost at New Orleans to assist in the rescue 
efforts.  The FEMA representative sent them away and said that it was more of a 
hassle to use them then to ignore them because the official operating 
procedures/structure did not easily allow extra units or individuals to be added into 
the response efforts.  Per the perspective of the Bureaucratic operator, the rules could 
not be bent to allow these actions.  Per the perspective of the HRO operators, this was 




this example, both sides were negatively impacted by the clash of Logics.  If the 
Logics were better understood, then operators could be better trained and procedural 







 The proposed methodology for this qualitative study was to examine a variety 
of formal and informal documents about the planning and response to Hurricane 
Katrina in New Orleans.  It was important to look at different types of accounts of the 
events surrounding Katrina in order to better understand what actually happened and 
the reasoning underlying the actions of the responders.  The charged political 
atmosphere and intense media focus created a climate of blame, finger-pointing, and 
presenting the best possible spin on all aspects.  Documents were collected including 
the transcripts of oral histories of 23 first responders detailing their experiences.  A 
coding scheme was developed to parse and analyze the oral histories.  The reality of 
the available documents and information was quite different than anticipated.  The 
data analysis schema was altered in terms of the unit of analysis and coding 
categories to be able to explicate the inherent themes in the accounts.  The limited 
nature and lack of transparency of the publically-available information has limited the 
effectiveness of study in this area.  In order to understand the planning and response 
to catastrophic disasters to be able to enact effective policy, there needs to be better 
information offered to the public and researchers in accessible formats. 
A variety of documents from the federal government and the first responders 
were used to identify patterns of operator behavior.  The following list is of the types 
of documents that were examined in this study. 
 
 Training materials and Standard Operating Procedures: 
 After-action reports from responding agencies 




 Government Accountability Office (GAO) reports concerning the 
response efforts, specifically about FEMA’s response 
 Congressional hearings and reports concerning Hurricane Katrina,  
 Academic writing and analyses, specifically in the academic disciplines 
of: emergency medicine, disaster management, public health, social 
psychology, organizational science, business – management and logistics, 
public policy and administration. 
 Oral Histories of Katrina first responders  
 
The formal documents were broken into two categories: training materials and 
standard operating procedures (SOPs), and after-action reports.  The training 
materials and SOPs were examined primarily as a way to understand the two 
institutional logics, FEMA’s bureaucratic logic and the first responders’ High-
Reliability Organization (HRO) logic.  The result of the analyses was a structure that 
can be used to evaluate the behavior of first responders in the Katrina response.  The 
behavior was looked at to understand which institutional logic the responder was 
operating from: bureaucratic, HRO, or mixed.  The NIMS, as put forth at the time of 
the Katrina response, was the primary set of documents looked at to understand 
FEMA’s bureaucratic institutional logic.  The HRO institutional logic was distilled 
from the other training materials and standard operating procedures.  The after-action 
reports were used to provide context to the situations and offer further insight into the 
hypothesized competing logics.   
 The transcripts of oral histories of first responders were the primary data 
analyzed to ascertain the behavior and underlying HRO institutional logic during the 
planning and response to Hurricane Katrina.  The transcripts were all captured by oral 
history initiatives in the two years after Hurricane Katrina.  Using the principles of 
grounded theory, as expounded by Miles & Huberman (1994), the responder accounts 




accounts to the level of incident, with an incident being a discreet episode with a start 
(i.e. 911 call or coming across a person in need) and an end (i.e. dropped off patient at 
facility or transferred care to another).  The predicted incidents that would be 
considered for this study were ones with either the outcome was clearly identified or 
had an outcome that could be identified using corroborating reports.  The plan also 
called for each incident to be coded as to the role of first responder (Emergency 
Medical Services, Fire, Rescue, body recovery/mortuary, transportation, or 
administration), type of episode (rescue or medical – illness or injury), outcome 
(negative or positive) and type of institutional logic employed (bureaucratic, HRO or 
mixed).  The anticipated coded incidents would be the analysis dataset that would 
undergo further analyses. 
 There were 23 oral histories specifically from the New Orleans area that were 
analyzed for this study, each history was between 20-60 pages long. (See Appendix A 
for the full details of the Oral History accounts.)  Each interview was conducted by 
the Historic New Orleans Collection’s Oral History Initiative staff.  The three main 
groups of responders that were in this subset of the collection: New Orleans 
Emergency Medical Services (2 histories), New Orleans Fire Department (7 
histories), and the California 6 Disaster Medical Assistance Team (DMAT) (14 
histories).  (The function of a DMAT is to be a deployable self-sufficient unit, meant 
to be sent anywhere in the United States to render emergency medical care in 
response to a disaster situation.  This team was deployed from California and was 




this qualitative analysis were to be a collection of quotes that pertained to the first 
responders’ incidents, actions, and their perceived understanding of the situations. 
The proposed study was crafted with the knowledge that there are limitations 
to using the documents selected.  The formal documents are extremely processed and 
edited to present a particular story from that organization.  The authorship may not be 
directly known and the documents may be written by individuals not directly 
involved with the response efforts.  Due to the focus of most of these reports, the 
response to Katrina is not detailed at the level of an incident, rather they look at the 
broader strokes of the entire event.  And it is in the details that the evidence of the 
institutional logics will be observable.   
 There are also limitations with using an oral history collection of this age that 
was collected by individuals with little background knowledge of emergency 
response.  The interviewer was a layperson, so technical jargon was not utilized by 
the responders.  This jargon would have been a useful indicator of institutional logics 
because each logic has its own vocabulary.  The majority of histories that were 
accessible (not under a 25-year gag order) may not have been of the key players who 
would have the insights into the response operations.  The oral history interviews 
covered general events and since they were completed years ago, further probing 
cannot be used, unlike during present-day interviewing.  Another limitation is that the 
majority of these accounts come from first responders who were in the field and not 
in the command centers, meaning that they would have a limited perspective on the 




When the data was examined after collection, the original research plan could 
not be completed due the content of the documents.  The formal documents (training 
materials, standard operating procedures (SOPs), and after-action reports) did 
showcase the bureaucratic institutional logic.  Interestingly, they all had the same 
focus and assumptions no matter the author-agency or the purpose of the report.  All 
the reports and documents focused solely on the efforts of the federal agencies, with 
little mention about the state governmental response, and no mention of any local 
agencies or non-governmental organizations (NGOs).  No credit was given to any 
person, agency, or type of agency that was not a federal-level agency.  Certain key 
documents from FEMA were also no longer available to the public (despite the same 
report being available pre- and post-Katrina).   
 The oral histories of first responders, as informal reports, were different than 
anticipated.  Only a subset of the collection was available, the rest were under a 25-
year long suppression order, per the request of the first responders (they feared 
repercussions such as losing their jobs if they were honest publically).  This means 
that the suppressed accounts may be more explicit in their accounting of what 
happened.  The collection of Historic New Orleans Collection’s Oral History 
Initiative is the sole collection of its kind, no others have collected first responder 
accounts.  These narratives were in a broken chronological order, not in complete 
incidents as was expected.  Most of the themes emerged on a sentence-basis not a 
story-basis.  And the original coding scheme could not be used since there were few 
discreet incidents that were identifiable and most did not have clear outcomes.  The 




And there was only one type of institutional logic that the responders operated under, 
HRO logic.   
 An interesting observation of the oral history analysis was that the anticipated 
23 different accounts were not actually that different.  The entire DMAT team 
experienced the exact same events over the course of their deployment, with few 
variations.  So all of their narratives tell the same story from a slightly different 
perspective.  The fire fighters also had a very consistent narrative.  Even though they 
were in different parts of the city and were dealing with different situations, their 
responses were all uniform.  They all acted as if they were in direct communication.  
The two EMS histories were radically different, one being an Emergency Medical 
Technician (EMT) working without an ambulance or any support and the other being 
an Emergency Department physician resident (who also worked as an EMT) who had 
a different level of autonomy than the first EMT. 
 A second type of informal report was found in the course of research, an 
insider’s published account.  The first was a FEMA insider who gave a history of 
FEMA and shared his experiences working through Katrina in FEMA headquarters. 
(Bosner 2011)  The second was an unofficial report written by two New Orleans 
firefighters of the NOFD response. (Hampton & McConnell 2006)  (The official 
after-action reports on the state or local levels are not readily available.)  Since these 
reports were written with the overview in mind, not just a personal experience, they 
became a complimentary counterpoint to the oral histories. 
 An alternative analysis was assumed as the study progressed.  The unit of 




themes to emerge without being constrained unduly by the coding structure.  The 
analysis was iterative open coding with sensitizing constructs.  (Miles & Huberman 
1994)  The originally conceived categories loosely followed the NIMS structure: 
preparedness (planning), communications and information management, resource 
management, and command and management (with one NIMS’ component, ongoing 
management and maintenance, not being used since it has a longer-term focus).  
These categories did not hold up when the themes emerged from the data.  The 
majority of the categories were notable for their lack of data within their area.   
 This study was hindered by a lack of specific types of information which is 
potentially influenced by several situational factors.  Catastrophic disasters are 
chaotic and traumatic for all involved.  Memories are not necessarily the most 
reliable.  And traditional documentation methods are not usually working within this 
type of situation.  In addition, there are privacy concerns not only for the victims but 
also the responders, as they too are impacted by catastrophic disasters.  In regards to 
Hurricane Katrina specifically, there was an incredibly charged political atmosphere 
due to the perceived failures and the intense media scrutiny.  This environment meant 
the government did not release information as it may have otherwise done or redacted 
the reports after releasing them.  This lack of transparency is troubling when 
considering the need for accurate data when evaluating the problem, so all potential 
solutions may never address the actual problem since it was never identified 
correctly.  In addition, there are many public health implications to withholding data 




 In order to understand the planning and response to Hurricane Katrina, several 
additional types of information would need to be shared.  The most critical types of 
information that would help this study and future research endeavors include: raw 
data, agency after-action reports from responding agencies of all 
governmental/agency level (there are no FEMA, state, or local after-action reports 
easily-found publically available, only secondary agencies such as the Government 
Accountability Office and Congressional hearings), non-governmental agency 
reports, and more personal accounts (which would mean individuals would have to 
not feel intimidated to keep silent).  There should also be a central repository about 
disaster planning and response that holds all applicable planning documents, after-
action reports, and accounts.  That way there is only one place policy-makers, 
emergency planners, and researchers need to access in order to compare and find 
potential solutions to their community’s specific needs.  The specific holes in the 
available information will need to be iteratively discovered as more information is 
released and analyzed since it is challenging to predict exactly what is not available or 












Emergency services based in New Orleans were informed Saturday, 
August 27, 2005, that the storm would be hitting the city and it would be severe.  
Many older residents were anticipating that it would be similar to Hurricane 
Betsy, which hit the area in 1965 as a Category 4 hurricane, and as a result chose 
not to evacuate. (Democratic Staff of the House Committee on Science 2006)  
The New Orleans Fire Department (NOFD) had a detailed operational plan in 
place for severe storms so they moved their apparatuses to high ground, stocked 
supplies in the primary and secondary shelters, and deployed to their assigned 
areas.  The firefighters anticipated assisting with evacuation and rescuing citizens 
using their normal equipment.  And while they were aware that fire could break 
out, they were not anticipating that whole neighborhoods would be in flame at 
the conclusion of the storm.  New Orleans Emergency Medical Services 
(NOEMS) were called in to work and told to bring three days’ worth of supplies.  
They did not have a specified disaster plan that they were following, so the 
responders went to work like normal.  The California 6 Disaster Medical 
Assistance Team (CA-6 DMAT) were put on stand-by by the DMAT Federal 
Operations Center, within DHS, on Saturday, August 27th but were not activated 
until Sunday, August 28th.  (A DMAT is a deployable unit that will bring together 
medical personnel, with supporting logistics and transportation personnel, from 




DMATs are loosely based on the military’s mobile hospitals.)  (Institute of 
Medicine Committee on the Future of Emergency Care 2006)   
5.1 Data Collected 
When the oral histories were examined, the three groups of responders 
(NOEMS, NOFD, and DMAT) were shown to have similar experiences and 
displayed similar themes.  There were twelve overall themes.  From the two oral 
histories from NOEMS, nine themes emerged from these accounts.  Of these nine 
themes, five of them were seen in all three responder groups and four others were 
in one other group besides the NOEMS.  The five themes found in all three 
groups were: poor or no communication (no radios, no cells, limited face-to-
face), breakdown in logistics, responder safety was tenuous, there was a lack of 
basic supplies, and interactions with FEMA officials was overwhelmingly 
negative.  In NOEMS and DMAT, there were three themes that they shared: 
feelings of betrayal arising from the government officials’ actions (and the actions 
of the New Orleans Police Department for NOEMS), the basis of action & 
decision-making was personal experience and previous training, and there was an 
impacted ability to make sense of what was going on.   
In addition, within the DMAT and the NOFD accounts there were 
themes of: patient transportation/evacuation mechanisms were not working as 
anticipated, the authority and leadership directing responders’ actions were 
acknowledged, and they utilized previously developed internal disaster plans.  
Within the DMAT accounts, there was also a theme of lack of documentation 




listed in the table below (see Appendix A, as the numbers after the quotes refer to 





Poor or no 
communication 
NOEMS Talking about the immediate response to Katrina 
“Interviewer: So, pretty much your work prior to that 
was pretty much all on your own initiative?... 
Responder: Yeah. 
Interviewer: …no one called you and said, we need you 
to come here or--? 
Responder: They would not have made me do that.” (1) 
“…the radio was very sporadic.  We couldn’t contact 
anybody on the radio.” (2) 
 DMAT “…was a combination of military and civilian 
helicopters… it was our folks who were loading the 
helicopters. So we don’t know, we don’t know how they 
were being controlled in the air. We just knew that they 
were landing and taking off and the pilots and the crew 
didn’t know anything about what was going on either. 
We didn’t know where people were going... we didn’t 
have any communication with them other then verbally, 
while, while they were on the ground.” (3) 
 NOFD “we heard Tuesday night that some guys from the fire 
department had a fire alarm and… they had wound up at 
Delgado College and they were trying to get out of 
there. They were surrounded by water. So our 
communications were pretty much shot at that time. We 
could hear them, then we tried to communicate back and 
we couldn’t get through to them.” (18)  
 
“And the fire department was very cut off from itself, 
because our whole communication system for the city: 
police, firemen, that’s all went to hell. We had pockets 
of firemen that – everybody was self sustained at first. 
Because we didn’t know what – you can’t get in touch 
with anybody. Cell phones, everything wasn’t working. 
The one thing you thought you could rely on, the radios, 
didn’t work. They worked all through the storm. It’s 
kind of funny: the radio system, the water – the levees 
breaking, the flooding, all that happened after the storm. 




NOEMS “We ended up leaving from there and we were looking 
for a place to go because, at that time, we didn’t know 
what the heck we were going to do…” (2) 
 DMAT “…the critical thing that I recall that should probably be 




mistake is that when we were staging in Houston we had 
very poor intelligence being brought in from forward 
placed units. We basically didn’t know what we were 
walking into…. It’s a multi-faceted set of conditions that 
created that particular result. Um, but that was one of 
them, a lack of communications infrastructure because 
the storm devastated so much. Um, but there was a lack 
of local planning on the parts of the locals there. There 
was a lack of planning at the state level in terms of their 
ability to support communications and initial disaster 
response locally. And then there was a failure at the 
federal level for them to be able to, they were able to 
mobilize units, but they weren’t able to coordinate and 
logistically supply those units in the way that they 
should have been able to do.” (14) 
Basis of action & 
decision-making 
NOEMS “…we’d either go post places or just drive, looking. You 
know, looking house to house. Looking for people who 
may need help. We even were feeding the poor animals 
that were starving to death.”(2) 
 DMAT “We’re a pretty aggressive group of providers and we’re 
getting pretty antsy. And we got all these things going 
on around us and we’re not allowed to participate 
because we’re not assigned.” (10) 
 
“And so we made the decision to, to leave. Because we 
were essentially out of medical supplies, they weren’t 
landing helicopters to evacuate, and then here’s this, you 
know, pending riot happening inside the Superdome… I 
was just sick to my stomach. And I could see that sort of 
in everybody else’s eyes as we were going through that 
half hour process of, let’s bug out, answering all the 
questions about do we take the patients or not… making 
all these decisions, in this hush hushed manner. Um you 
could see it was really distressing to everybody.” (3) 
 NOFD “We found out at that time… Lindy Boggs [hospital] 
needed to be evacuated…they said that 15 people at 
Lindy Boggs were in danger of dying if they weren’t, 
like evacuated immediately…And what they did was, 
they loaded up boats full of patients and patients’ 
families and medical staff and sent them back to us at 
the staging area…” (18) 
 
“Days into it, you know, I mean, eight, ten, twelve days 
in to it, when we started relocating and meeting up with 
other members of the fire department that you hadn’t 
seen for a week and a half, two weeks, and you started 
talking to them. And it was funny because they were 
doing the same thing we were doing, just in a different 
location of the city. You know, so it was really 
impressive that, even though communications were cut 




could speak to face to face. You know, the guys that 




NOEMS “…we didn’t have any place to go…We had to be 
rescued ourselves out of there by boats…” (2) 
 DMAT “I was more or less assistant communication officer… 
had the foresight, to bring a cache of [unclear] radios 
with us, because what happened was our cache or our 
full load of equipment broke down on the Nevada-
California border, and so we only had eight radios and 
chargers and a sat phone, and so we were very limited in 
our ability to communicate internally and externally.” 
(4) 
 
Talking about after-deployment in Baton Rouge, trying 
to get basic supplies for the responders.  
“So I went down there with them. I was given a FEMA 
credit card. I was told it was going to work…because we 
had no equipment. We’d left all our equipment at the 
Superdome, all our personal equipment. And got to the 
cash registers, and the FEMA credit card didn’t work. 
So I put down my American Express card, which I 
finally got reimbursed for almost a year later, I think 
about a year later, you know. It was a couple thousand 
dollars worth of stuff. Then I went back to Baton Rouge, 
and I said, ‘This card didn’t work.’ 
They said, ‘Oh, we forgot to call the bank and unblock 
it.’” (4) 
 NOFD “We had no water…[no water pressure to fight any of 
the fires] That was a shock to us… that I realized we’ve 
got problems with water. And, you know, I mean, we 
were – at that fire, it was like, come drop your hoses in 
the street and suck the water out of the street.” (17) 
 
“And it was chaos because we still didn’t know who 
was at work – wasn’t at work – it was chaos, confusion, 
people – people were stranded. People were here, half 
the people were there. We didn’t have a whole lot break 
ranks but, you know, they did have a few, but it was 
very hard to try to find who was here and who wasn’t. 
You know, and accountability.” (17) 
Safety was 
tenuous 
NOEMS “…but they were still working in a city that was 
destroying itself and, you know, basically morale was 
not very good. You know, some of them had been shot 
at and, you know, other ones had stories like mine.” (1) 
 DMAT “Dave is… taking this lady on a mattress up into this 
National Guard truck, and shots rang out, you know. All 
the National Guard and Dave and everybody kind of hits 
the deck, and we look around. They finally get her 





“And whoa, they’re shooting the Guardsmen. Now what 
will they do to us, you know? It felt extremely unsafe, 
but I didn’t have anybody threaten me….” (9) 
 NOFD “I became a security chief on the first day… and I 
gathered all the firemen that had military experience and 
we set up our security for that night. We set up a 
perimeter around the college campus, and we set up a 
watch list. And we had, you know, an organized security 
force by the next day. Because, when we started coming 
back into the city, we sent one fireman on each fire 
truck armed to protect the fire truck. Because there were 
– there were first responders who were getting shot at. I 
didn’t personally see it, but I heard about people on 
boats and other places that were shot at.” (20) 
Lack of basic 
supplies 
NOEMS “-no food, no water and all that kind of stuff.” (2) 
 DMAT “…we had what we had, so we’re running out of 
everything from the get go… I was triaging patients, and 
deciding how much oxygen this person should or should 
not have, or if they really needed it…” (10) 
“I was sorry I couldn’t get people more appropriate 
medication. We didn’t have any more formula for the 
babies. We didn’t have any more diapers.” (9) 
 NOFD “We were hungry… I never thought I’d ever experience 
– to be hungry and not have nothing to eat. To be filthy 
dirty and not be able to clean your clothes. I mean, it’s 





NOEMS “So we wound up…at the new FEMA headquarters… 
and I met the Director of Urban Search and Rescue for 
FEMA who then, unbelievably, wound up telling me 
and my friend, who are emergency-medicine trained and 
the Operations Manager of Acadian Ambulance… that 
there wasn’t any room for us on any other teams. And 
that it would be more of a hassle because we’d have to 
be federalized to be able to work with FEMA. So, they 
basically turned their back on two emergency medicine 
trained physicians, and an entire ambulance service, 
because we didn’t fit into the overall scheme of things 
and they’d have to bend the rules a little bit for us to be 
able to work with them, so- which I found extremely 
alarming…” (1) 
 DMAT “…and then when we got down to the waterline where 
we had to stop—the trucks refused to drive through the 
water. They were big refrigerator trucks, and one of the 
FEMA guys who wanted the equipment was up on the 
thing screaming at us. He obviously didn’t care much 
for our team. He’s just screaming—I’m not sure how 




that equipment and those goddamned trucks across the 
way.” He said, “CA-6 can just swim in the water, for all 
I care. I want those trucks.” That was our command and 
saying, you know, “You guys are worthless. I just want 
the equipment.” He was up there screaming. It was 
terrible...” (5) 
 
“…I never saw a FEMA person come up to the arena to 
see what we were doing, you know.” (4) 
 NOFD “But we stayed there and, come to find out, that FEMA 
had shut the operation down…And they said – they told 
us to get out. Not only that… people at the FEMA 
staging area told us, if we bring anybody else there, they 
were going to arrest us. So, it was really…they said they 
were going to take our boats and arrest us. So –… they 
were ordered out and they were under threat if it – if we 
brought any more people to FEMA, they were going to 
get arrested and, you know, that really weighed heavily 
on them because…the people that they had promised 
and, you know, that they thought that we had plenty of 







DMAT “…That operation went on to about three o’clock in the 
morning when a National Guardsman was shot with his 
own weapon…but at that point they shut the air 
operations down.  I went back down at seven o’clock in 
the morning and talked to the colonel and said, “Okay, 
let’s start up air operations again. We’ve got a backlog 
of patients.” By then we had a huge backlog of patients. 
He said, “We’re not going to bring any more helicopters 
in here.” 
I said, “I don’t understand.” 
He said, “You heard me. We’re not going to bring any 
more helicopters in here.” …and they had an anti-
sniping team up on the landing zone, you know, with 
Ghillie suits on and everything. [due to citizens shooting 
at the helicopters] 
I said, “Oh, my god, you know, this is not a good 
situation.” So then I went back and told Commander 
Lipin, “We can’t start up air operations again. They’re 
not flying any more helicopters in…” (4) 
 NOFD “So I went to go get my truck because I had the boat 
with me…There was roughly about 22 to 25 New 
Orleans firemen that brought their personal boats to 
work on that day.” (19) 
Authority and 
leadership 
NOEMS “Well, in a perfect world, I’d like to say somebody was 
orchestrating activities during something like that, but 
there really wasn’t…. We were actually there for about 





 NOFD “I just think that compassion of the firemen really came 
through. To be able – especially the ones that did all the 
boat rescues and all of that stuff, and all that. I mean, 
these guys didn’t have to be told twice. They just – I 
mean, there were times you couldn’t find people, and 
they were supposed to be at the compound at nighttime, 
and they were out in boats in the darkness right at – you 
know, they weren’t even supposed to be out there. Well, 
how are you going to – you can’t – what are you going 
to do, get on people and discipline them for doing that. 
I think – you know, that’s just the will of the heart there. 
I mean, these guys really came through big time, you 
know with helping people and all that.” (17) 
Betrayal NOEMS “I remember feeling a sense of betrayal by authorities… 
I felt like we were failed. Because help just couldn’t get 
to us quick enough… And so many people died… that 
was a huge slap in the face for them to leave us like they 
did… they said I would never leave anybody behind. 
None of us would. That’s not what we’re trained to do. 
We’re trained to help…” (2) [Responder was part of 
EMS group abandoned by the police unit they were 
supposed to be working with and had to self-evacuate to 
safety.] 
 DMAT “I think sort of at a more abstract level I think my faith 
in the federal government, actually in government at all 
levels has gone down several notches… and not place 
my faith in, you know, someone else’s ability to 
determine whether or not a site is secure enough for us 
to go into or not…” (3) 
Lack of 
documentation 
DMAT “Interviewer: You mentioned you often had to separate 
children and parents. Was there any type of 
bookkeeping going on as far as…? 
Responder: None whatsoever. We had ah; we had lost 
all ability to do any recordkeeping… All the paper 
records, and we only carry five hundred or something 
with us, and those were long gone…So there was no, 
yeah, there was nothing, no record keeping, no, and we 
were far too busy with the patients to have any ability to 
care for the people who weren’t patients. When we 
separated family members it was.” (3) 
Using previous 
established plans 
DMAT “But there is a structure, a process that we follow…a 
sort of chain of command called the incident command 
system... I think that that probably enabled us to 
function as well as we did in that environment…But it 
wasn’t designed for that purpose, for that extreme.” (3) 
 NOFD “This is the purpose and the guideline – from a 
hurricane guideline book, the 2005, that our 
Superintendent had put together two years ago, and we 
sort of tweaked it last year with Ivan. We made some 




again to it. But we were prepared…. We had a hurricane 
procedure guidebook in place, where all of our 
equipment and all of our personnel had a last place of 
refuge for the storm. And then we regrouped again for 
the flood, and evaluated and made the decision to move 
all of the equipment to the West Bank, which was the 
reason why we all – we saved all our equipment. We 
didn’t – we only lost a couple of small pieces of 
equipment. We had a plan and we stuck to it, pretty 
much. It wasn’t perfect, but it got us to where we needed 
to be, on dry land with drinking water and, you know, 
some facilities. So, you know, I credit our 
Superintendent for the foresight and Chief Gary Savelle 
for working so hard in putting it together. And it 
worked.” (20) 
 
In all of these emergency responder accounts, the most interesting aspect 
was that there were key anticipated elements that were completely not mentioned 
by any responder.  The themes that were not present include: no overarching 
resource management, no incident command or overall command center (only 
the local New Orleans command post was mentioned by only one of the 
firefighters), or an inability to document any aspect of the response.  The missing 
elements show that the responders were completely operating out of their HRO 
Institutional Logic, and NIMS (as the bureaucratic way to deal with this type of 
situation) was completely not used.  NIMS and its roll-out was unsuccessful, it 
was not adapted.  A new solution needs to be developed that works with agencies 
and operators from both types of Institutional Logics. 
5.2 Hypothesized Framework  
From the data analyzed, the table below was developed.  The table shows 




of the continual break-down of information flows in catastrophic disaster 
planning and response. 
Elements Bureaucracy HRO 

















Basis of action Standard Operating 
Procedures 
Situational awareness 
Organization structure Hierarchical 
departments 
Squads within 
companies or agencies 
How organizational 
change is enacted 
Changing the official 
policies and 
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 Inter-organizational information flow break-downs continue to persist 
within the planning and response efforts to catastrophic disasters.  These 
significant information flow problems arise from fundamental, but critical, 
differences in institutional logics among the collection of organizations that are 
involved in catastrophic disaster response.  A framework comparing the 
Bureaucratic and High-Reliability Organizational Institutional Logics was 
hypothesized, which will hopefully provide insight and directions of further 
research.  
 There are limitations inherent in this study.  This is an exploratory study 
looking at a problem that cannot be directly observed, which can lead to faulty 
assumptions and conclusions being made during the research process.  This study 
was conducted in a very limited time span and had few resources to depend 
upon.  Hurricane Katrina was the exemplar catastrophic disasters focused upon 
and since the NIMS was still being implemented when Katrina hit, the changes 
FEMA were attempting to enact may not have yet shown up in the emergency 
response organizations’ operator behaviors.  Despite the potential limitations, this 
study offers prospective directions on how further research efforts can contribute 
to the discussion and, hopefully, to an effective solution.  
This continuing problem needs further research into the causes and 
potential solutions in order have more effective and efficient catastrophic disaster 
planning and response efforts.  Hurricane Katrina is but one catastrophic disaster, 




understanding can be developed.  This area would also benefit from different 
types of research studies looking at these issues, such as participant observation 
studies or more in-depth case studies.  There would be value in expanding the 
study boundaries to look at disasters at locations around the world, comparing if 
the framework is valid within different cultures.  Most importantly, the 
framework of co-existing Institutional Logics and the subsequent information 
flow problems can be studied in other types of organizations (tribal and local or 
federal and non-governmental agencies) and in other contexts besides 
catastrophic disasters.  These further research directions will allow a depth and 
richness to the understanding of the problems involved with creating and 
maintaining effective information flows in chaotic environments. 
 One of the contributions of this study was the identification of major gaps 
in the publically-available accessible information about disaster planning and 
response efforts in the United States.  These gaps are detrimental to the efforts of 
policy-makers, academics, and the emergency responder fields.  Without a better 
understanding of the actions taken in previous disaster situations, the reasons for 
said actions, and the outcomes, better policies and procedures cannot be created 
that will potentially ameliorate the unnecessary death and destruction.  So there 
will continue to be a high rate of mortality, morbidity, and loss of property and 






Appendix A: Oral Histories Information 
All oral histories were recorded through the New Orleans Oral History Initiative and 




Names Position Organization 
1 Chris Najberg, MD Emergency medicine resident and a 
supervisor for NOEMS 
NOEMS 
2 Melinda Guerra, 
EMP-P 
Emergency Medical Technician – 
Paramedic  
NOEMS 
3 David Lipin, EMT-P Commander & Paramedic CA-6 DMAT 
4 Richard E. Brown, 
EMT-B 
EMT & Communications Specialist CA-6 DMAT 
5 Dawn Boyer Comer, 
EMT-B 
EMT-B, certified grief counselor CA-6 DMAT 
6 Brian Blaisch, MD Chief Medical Officer & Deputy 
Team Leader 
CA-6 DMAT 
7 Crystal D. Wright, 
EMT-P 
Emergency Medical Technician – 
Paramedic 
CA-6 DMAT 
8 Rev. Toby Nelson, 
Th.D. 
Chaplain & certified trauma 
counselor 
CA-6 DMAT 
9 Shaun Partlow, P.A. Physician Assistant CA-6 DMAT 
10 Kevin Sankey, R.T. Respiratory Therapist CA-6 DMAT 
11 Bonnie Atencio, RN Registered Nurse & Administrative 
Officer 
CA-6 DMAT 
12 Elizabeth Leia 
Mehlman, RN 
Registered Nurse CA-6 DMAT 
13 LeNai Dohr, RN Registered Nurse CA-6 DMAT 
14 Ron Lopez, RN Registered Nurse & Supervisory 
Nurse Specialist 
CA-6 DMAT 
15 John McPartland Deputy Logistics Chief & Assistant 
Training Officer 
CA-6 DMAT 
16 Barbara Morita, P.A. Physician Assistant CA-6 DMAT 
17 Chris Mickal District Chief & founding member 
of the NOFD Photo Unit 
NOFD 
18 Joseph Fincher Captain NOFD 
19 Thomas Meagher Captain NOFD 
20 Gordon Cagnolatti District Chief NOFD 
21 Robert McCoy Captain NOFD 
22 Thomas Howley Captain NOFD 
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Appendix B: Further details about the National Incident 
Management System 
 
NIMS is a standardized system of how to approach incident management as 
well as a core set of terminology, concepts, and technology. (Walsh et al. 2005)  This 
program was created after Homeland Security Presidential Directive-5 (HSPD-5) was 
enacted in early 2005 (Walsh et al. 2005) in conjunction with the 9/11 Commission’s 
recommendation that a universal emergency response plan with clear command and 
control structures and mechanisms should be created. (9/11 Commission 2004)  
NIMS was implemented in March of 2004. (Walsh et al. 2005).  This program was 
conceived of and created by the federal government officials.  NIMS was their answer 
to all the problems and questions that arise in a response to a catastrophic disaster.  
Emergency responders from any level of government or agencies were not part of the 
creation process. (Bosner 2011) 
NIMS was built on the foundation of several previous programs and 
frameworks, seemingly without an analysis of what the previous plan strengths and 
weaknesses were. (Buck et al. 2006)  In response to the extensive forest fires in 
California in the 1970’s that required multi-agency responses, the firefighting 
agencies created a system that was eventually known as the Incident Command 
System (ICS). (Buck et al. 2006).  ICS was supported and promoted by the 
firefighting community, teaching it in all of the basic training classes.  ICS focuses on 
planning, training, operations, and logistics, including: 
“standardized job descriptions with a training program for 
those positions; common terms for equipment and supplies; a 




to the incident commander with unity of command emphasized 
and each person in the organization reporting to one boss; 
authority commensurate with responsibility, and task 
assignments made rationally to the person most qualified for 
the assignment regardless of rank in the organization; span of 
control limited to the number of people that one person can 
effectively control; sectoring of work to insure efficiency, 
effectiveness and safety; finally ICS is based on the scalar 
principle, with its size and complexity depending on the size 
and complexity of the disaster or emergency incident to which 
it is applied.” (Buck et al. 2006, pp. 1) 
 
ICS is acknowledged as being strong in the command and control areas and it was 
revolutionary when it was developed. (Buck et al. 2006)  One of the system’s greatest 
strengths was that it had and continues to have complete acceptance of the 
firefighting community, which is a very tightly-knit community.   
The system is not without its flaws, as discussed in Buck et al. (2006).  ICS 
does not facilitate inter-agency coordination, especially when there are different types 
of agencies (i.e. law enforcement, emergency medicine agencies, and relief agencies).  
There were still communication issues which were made worse when the agencies 
had never trained together prior.  The system does not deal well with civilian 
organizations.  And control of the situation was often lost when there was a transfer 
of command from the initial Incident Commander in the field to the commander in 
the staff in the Command Center. 
The Federal Response Plan was developed in 1992 by FEMA to also address 
the coordination issues seen in multi-agency disaster responses. (Bosner 2011; DHS 
2013)  Originally, the FRP was completely separate but eventually incorporated ICS 
and the two systems were dovetailed. (Bosner 2011)  ICS and the Federal Response 




Oklahoma City Bombing (1995), the Atlanta Olympics bombing (1996), and the 
DeBrice grain elevator explosion (1998). (Buck et al. 2006).  These responses were 
considered successful implementation of ICS with positive results.  As a note, all of 
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